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CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY? VALUE ALLOCATION 
AND THE PARTNERING EFFECT OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
ABSTRACT 
Can value allocation be left to managerial discretion and does corporate law provide 
the basis for a balanced stakeholder management and a fair allocation of results? This 
question is central in an age of inequality. We argue that it can be reappraised by 
building upon the case of maritime law. Whereas in corporate law, the board is in 
charge of allocating the results, maritime stipulates a clear ex ante rule when it allows 
a captain to sacrifice some goods to save the ship: the historical “rule of general 
averages” has emerged in Antiquity. It compels the interested parties to bear jointly 
the costs. This rule makes visible what we call a “partnering effect” of managerial 
authority and suggests that corporate law, as it currently stands, lacks a 
conceptualization of managerial discretion and therefore limits the possibility of a fair 
allocation of results. While management scholars have sought to rethink management 
theory with a “view from law” (Lan & Heracleous, 2010), we conclude that law could 
also be discussed with a view from management history. 
Keywords 
Stakeholder theory, managerial discretion; value allocation; corporate law; managerial 
authority; partnering effect; fairness 
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CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY? VALUE ALLOCATION 
AND THE PARTNERING EFFECT OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION 
Today, there are growing inequality corporate behavior (Bivens & Mischel, 2015). 
A recent report noted that in France, the distribution of wealth among the stakeholders 
of the biggest listed companies has never been so unequal: from 2009 to 2016, the 40 
biggest companies redistributed 67.4% of their profits to shareholders in the form of 
dividends as opposed to only 5.3% to employees (Aubry, Alliot & Ly, 2018). Income 
inequality can have significant effects on organizations (Bapuji & Neville, 2015; Ni, 
Qian & Crilly, 2014), and managerial decisions are recognized as a key factor in 
income inequality (Cobb, 2016), which has reached its highest level ever in the 
United States (Atkinson, Piketty & Saez, 2011). This situation revives the question of 
whether value allocation should be normatively ruled by law or left to corporate 
freedom and managerial discretion.  
This is a challenging question for stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theorists 
emphasize that stakeholders should not be considered in terms of their respective 
power, but based on the principle of fairness (Buren, 2001; Phillips, 2003). However, 
they usually refrain from setting clear rules on how to allocate the value created by 
joint investments in the corporate ventures among the different stakeholders. They 
argue instead that value allocation is a managerial tool (Scott, Garza, Conlon & You 
Jin, 2014): managers use value sharing as a means of reducing supervision costs, 
limiting free riding, increasing parties’ motivation (Kruse, 1996), and retaining their 
willful participation to foster value creation (Harrison, Bosse & Phillips, 2010). 
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Stakeholder theorists generally consider that it is in the interest of the company to 
allocate rewards in a neutral and fair way, as this determines the possibility of 
investments from the different constituencies in the company. In this view, the role of 
corporate law is not to rule on value allocation, but to protect the board, for instance 
by insulating directors from stakeholder pressure (Blair & Stout, 1999; Lan & 
Heracleous, 2010). 
 
Yet, given the increasing level of inequality, several questions arise: Is corporate 
leeway sufficient to deal with value allocation? Do corporate leaders have the 
necessary latitude to balance rewards? And does corporate law provide the basis for 
stakeholder management? 
 
In this study, we investigate the absence of a normative framework and the 
principle of managerial leeway in allocating value by examining the historical case of 
maritime law.  
This historical rule is interesting because, while corporate law leaves value 
allocation to the discretion of companies’ leaders, maritime law adopts the opposite 
norm: it specifies a clear ex ante rule on value sharing. Maritime law vests the 
captains with great latitude and authority: captains are legally allowed to jettison the 
goods they are carrying if that will save their vessel from being shipwrecked. Yet, 
contrary to corporate law, maritime law does not let the captain (or anyone else) 
decide how the loss is to be shared: it stipulates that the effects of decisions made for 
the common good should be jointly supported. This rule is called the rule of “general 
averages,” as it deals with damages that are general, i.e. decided by the captain and 
for the collective interest, as opposed to damages that merchants bear privately. 
13917 
 
 4 
 
We argue that the rule of general averages has important implications for fair 
value allocation. First, it provides an expanded view of managerial discretion. The 
literature has recognized the importance of the distributive managerial discretion: 
directors’ leeway to allocate value is central to allow firm specific investment (Blair 
and Stout, 1999). But another type of managerial discretion, a strategic discretion, 
must be taken into account as employees, like other stakeholders, not only make firm-
specific investments: their human capital may also be impacted, either positively or 
negatively, by managerial decisions. Such impacts generate interdependencies that to 
date have been overlooked, both the team production theory and by corporate law. 
Second, the maritime rule leads to conceptualize what we call the “partnering effect” 
of managerial discretion. In maritime law, the ship captain’s decision binds the parties 
on whose behalf the decision is made. We argue that in companies, managerial 
discretion also has a partnering effect for those stakeholders who accept the 
managerial authority. Third, the partnering effect has not only implication for 
stakeholder theory. It has also normative implications. To date, corporate law has 
provided directors with the leeway to allocate value, and the team production theory 
considers that this normative framework allows for a fair allocation of value. 
However, we argue that an appropriate conceptualization of strategic discretion and 
its general effects should lead to a solidarity rule and a limitation on distributive 
discretion.  
 
Thus, our study opens up new ways to manage value allocation in companies and 
suggests an agenda for future research on how corporate law could integrate an 
explicit solidarity rule. It also invites management scholars to use their comprehensive 
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view of management and management history to rethink corporate law in terms of 
stakeholder orientation.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines why the 
literature views managerial discretion as a central condition for stakeholder 
management and why this needs to be reexamined. The following section develops 
the historical case of maritime law and the model of the partnering effect. The final 
section discusses the theory and implications of this model for contemporary 
companies. Three preliminary remarks are necessary to specify the scope of our 
research. First, by value allocation, we mean not only the distribution of net corporate 
income, but also the impacts of management decisions on stakeholders. For example, 
managers can increase (or decrease) share value and employees’ competencies and 
employability. A company can either issue or buy back shares, and can either provide 
secure jobs or impose layoffs. Following stakeholder theory, we are thus concerned 
with all of the potential impacts of management decisions on stakeholders. Second, 
we do not deal with the general question of fairness or equity in companies, nor do we 
discuss the various means managers use to allocate value. Instead, we examine 
whether managers have the necessary leeway to be fair within existing normative 
frameworks and whether value allocation should be left to managerial discretion or 
determined by a normative rule. Therefore, our literature review focuses on 
stakeholder theory, managerial discretion, and value allocation in corporate law. 
Third, and for the same reasons, we do not make any distinction among corporate 
leaders. Although there are clear and important distinctions between directors, non-
executive directors, and executive officers, we do not distinguish between them 
because we focus specifically on the corporate freedom to allocate value. 
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Consequently, we refer to “management” as “the team of directors and officers who 
shape board decisions” (Bebchuk, 2005: 842).  
 
THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IN STAKEHOLDER 
MANAGEMENT 
The Need for Equity: a central Issue for Stakeholder management  
The term “stakeholder” was popularized by Freeman (1984), but the impetus 
toward stakeholder theory emerged earlier. It arose from the conviction that 
management’s role goes beyond a profit maximization function and that the 
responsibilities of managers are far broader in scope than merely maximizing 
shareholder value (Friedman, 1970), extending to the interests and claims of non-
stockholding groups (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997)).  
 
Fundamentally, stakeholder theory views the firm as a “wealth creating team” 
(Kaufman & Englander, 2005) and as a nexus of team-specific assets provided by 
shareholders, managers, employees, and others who hope to profit from team 
production (Gabrielsson, Huse & Minichilli, 2007). It aims to overcome what it 
perceives as the shortcomings of standard organizational economic approaches that 
focus on ownership, contracts, and incentives (Silverman & Ingram, 2017). 
 
In arguing that management has relationships with a variety of parties beyond 
their strict contractual obligations, stakeholder theory considers that the essence of the 
firm goes beyond the mere nexus of contracts. It is concerned with the alignment of 
the different parties rather than the divergences and conflicts that are predominant in 
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the economic view, to be resolved purely by market transactions and contracts, 
especially in agency theory (Davis et al., 1997: 21; see also Dean, 2001: 94). 
Economic and social purposes can be aligned if we accept that it is both the raison 
d’être of the firm to create value for all its constituencies and, stakeholder theory 
argues, a condition of its sustainable existence (Clarkson, 1995; Harrison et al., 2010; 
Post, Preston & Sachs, 2002) The capacity of a firm to generate sustainable wealth 
over time is determined by its relationships with critical stakeholders (Post et al., 
2002). Hence, stakeholder management is expected to improve both the economic 
efficacy of the firm and the social justice among its stakeholders.  
 
Management scholars have characterized the various sources of stakeholders’ 
rights. Beyond the legal claims of the first stakeholders (“internal or primary” 
stakeholders), some stakeholders have no contractual relationships, but nonetheless 
are critical to the firm’s operations (Clarkson, 1995). They can claim some rights to 
the firm’s value (Asher, Mahoney & Mahoney, 2005), as they contribute to the 
wealth-creation process, either through specific investments (Hill & Jones, 1992) or 
because the value of their assets is affected by the fate of the enterprise (Kochan & 
Rubinstein, 2000).  
 
Although there have been numerous debates on whether and how these rights 
should be recognized contractually and enforced normatively, scholars have mainly 
considered that stakeholder management was not a matter of legal obligations. It was 
assumed that management should pay attention to the various stakeholders because 
this was critical for the firm’s long-term legitimacy and sustainability (Clarkson, 
1995; Post et al., 2002) and was necessary to maximize the wealth-creation 
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capabilities of the firm (Phillips, Berman, Elms & Johnson-Cramer, 2010; Phillips, 
Berman, Johnson-Cramer & Elms, 2007). Under this approach, managerial discretion 
is a key condition for stakeholder management and fair value allocation.  
 
Managerial discretion: a key condition for stakeholder management  
“Managerial discretion can be defined as the latitude of managerial action 
available to a decision-maker” (Wangrow, Schepker & Barker, 2015): 100), be it 
latitude in terms of objectives or in terms of actions (Shen & Cho, 2005). Hambrick, 
Finkelstein and their co-authors first posited that managerial discretion circumscribes 
the options for strategic choice, and therefore determines the potential impact leaders 
can have on organizations, be it in relation to firm performance or value allocation 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987). Managerial discretion is seen rather negatively by agency 
theorists, as it leaves the door open to managerial opportunism, but it is viewed more 
positively by stakeholder theorists. Although stakeholder theory is not framed 
explicitly in terms of managerial discretion, its central premise is that managers have 
the leeway to pay attention to different constituencies and to promote the general 
welfare. For instance, stewardship is facilitated when a CEO chairs the board of 
directors because he/she is then given greater authority and discretionary powers 
(Charreaux, 2015; Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
 
The literature on managerial discretion has addressed both the antecedents for and 
the effects of managerial discretion. Regarding its antecedents, managerial discretion 
appears to be constrained not only by the task environment, internal organization, 
managerial characteristics, and activities (Finkelstein & Peteraf, 2007), but also by the 
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broader environment. Industry regulation and state legislation play a noticeable role in 
managerial discretion (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007, 2011). The impacts of 
managerial discretion have also been studied, especially in relation to executive 
compensation and firm performance (Wangrow et al., 2015). However, the dynamics 
of managerial discretion is rarely analyzed, and this may be especially problematic for 
stakeholder theory, which has lofty expectations regarding managers. It is one thing to 
suggest that managers are expected to pay attention to the needs of different 
stakeholders, but do they have the discretion to do so?  
 
The Team Production Theory of the Corporation  
Legally speaking, managers are given considerable leeway to allocate value. Team 
production theory proposes that corporate law is designed precisely to give directors 
the discretion to allocate value in a fair and efficient way (Blair et al., 1999; Lan et al., 
2010). According to Blair and Stout, a firm is created when a series of individual 
efforts are combined, with a cooperative spirit, for a joint output. Specific investments 
(meaning that they are difficult to recover once committed to the project) must be 
made by the different gains are inseparable (meaning that it is difficult to attribute any 
particular portion of the gains to any particular stakeholder). Under these conditions, 
it is difficult to draft explicit contracts regarding value allocation because it is difficult 
to decide on the allocation of profits beforehand, as it would reduce incentive, but if 
the rules for sharing are not decided in advance, there is the risk of very expensive ex 
post bargaining.  
 
To agree on a procedure that all consider fair, what do team members do? “They 
form a public corporation” (Blair and Stout, 1999: 771): they voluntarily transfer 
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“authority over the division of production rents and surpluses to an independent body 
– a mediating hierarchy in the form of the board of directors – that will monitor their 
efforts and determine how each can best be rewarded for past contributions, as well as 
be incentivized for future contributions, in the process also guarding against mutual 
opportunism among the parties” (Lan and Heracleous, 2010: 300).  
 
Thus, the board is conceived as a third party capable of arbitration between the 
stakeholders to solve potential conflicts of interest (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lan et 
al., 2010). Its role is to encourage firm-specific investments by making sure that value 
is allocated in a fair way. To give it the necessary leeway to do that, corporate law 
aims at protecting directors’ discretion in a number of ways. For instance, the 
business judgment rule grants that directors’ decisions cannot be challenged by 
stakeholders in normal situations, i.e. if they were made in good faith, on an informed 
basis, and “in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the 
company” (Blair & Stout, 1999: 787).  
 
The Managers’ leeway in question 
As some authors have noted, stakeholder theorists often refer to managerial 
discretion, but they rarely “consider whether and to what extent managers have the 
freedom or capacity to act according to stakeholder theory’s moral and instrumental 
prescriptions” (Phillips, et al., 2010: 176). One can, however, question the reality of 
the board’s discretion to allocate value given the possibility of unbalanced 
distributional outcomes among the parties. Recent studies have analyzed the proactive 
way in which managers use their discretion to allocate value (Cobb, 2016) and 
empirically documented evidence that the latitude of the board is often constrained.  
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In practice, both shareholders and stakeholders can limit a manager’s leeway. 
Shareholders are given great power to influence directors, as directors are appointed 
exclusively by the shareholders (Greenfield, 2008; Greenwood, 2005; Mayer, 2013). 
The directors are legally accountable to the firm’s shareholders (Kaufman et al., 
2005), and thus corporate law does not really “insulate” the board from shareholder 
pressure (Millon, 2000). More generally, some stakeholders, even if they do not have 
explicit legal rights, can influence the firm’s behavior (Mitchell et al., 1997). Previous 
studies have described how the value that is created can be appropriated by 
stakeholders in accordance with their respective bargaining power (Coff, 1999; 
Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015).  
 
Given these conditions, two main options have been considered in addressing 
inequality. The first consists of reinforcing managerial discretion against external 
pressure. Various corporate laws have been amended, such as the constituency 
statutes that strengthen managers’ leeway and allow them to pay attention to interests 
other than those of the shareholders (Bainbridge, 2004). New legal forms of 
corporations, such as benefit corporations, have also been introduced in a number of 
states to provide a “safe harbor” to allow managers of companies to pursue social or 
environmental objectives (Bromberger, 2011; Mac Cormac & Haney, 2012, 2012 ). 
The alternative is to make managers accountable to various stakeholders (Wells, 
2002) by extending measures of performance beyond mere shareholder value, 
broadening fiduciary duties, or broadening the control rights of various parties by 
allowing them to sit on the board (Asher et al., 2005). These proposals have been 
implemented locally, but have given rise to a number of criticisms. For instance, it has 
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been argued that managers can hardly be asked to pursue all stakeholders’ interests, as 
this could lead to significant control issues (Boatright, 1994; Jensen, 2001). The need 
to attend to multiple stakeholders would likely diminish managers’ accountability. 
Any attempt to challenge directors would become illusory, as any decision could be 
justified in terms of its potential impact on at least one stakeholder (Sternberg, 2009).  
 
While managerial discretion has been seen as a fundamental condition for fair 
value allocation, it is necessary to revisit this concept and reexamine how corporate 
law should handle managerial discretion, either by providing greater protection for it 
or by providing clear rules on how it can be exercised in a fair way.  
 
THE CASE OF MARITIME LAW: THE RULE OF GENERAL AVERAGES 
To reexamine the legitimacy of normative principles regarding value allocation 
and the soundness of distributive discretion, we use the specific example of maritime 
law. We are particularly interested in one of the rules of maritime law, the so-called 
“rule of general averages,” as it concerns the way in which the consequences of the 
captain’s decisions are shared among the various parties involved. This rule explicitly 
connects the discretionary power of the captain with a specific rule regarding value 
allocation. The captain’s decisions that are taken for the “common good” imply rules 
that contrast with those of corporate law in that they do not leave the allocation of the 
value to the discretion of the captain.  
 
The captain’s situation is very different from that of a business manager, but the 
analogy is interesting, from a methodological point of view, in terms of thinking 
about the implications of discretion in relation to value allocation. Following Ketokivi 
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et al. (2017), this is a “novel analogy” in the sense that it can lead to fruitful 
theoretical insights and challenge existing theories. Ketokivi et al. (2017) propose a 
methodology to evaluate such an analogy, which must meet three criteria: 1) 
relevance (“Does the analogy offer potential for insight? Is the analogy familiar 
enough to be understood by the audience?”), 2) structural soundness (“Does the 
analogy lend itself to multiple related research questions?”), and 3) factual validity 
(“Does the analogy lend itself to empirical research?”).  
 
Before presenting the theoretical insights provided by the historical case, some 
remarks are necessary in relation to the relevance of the case. First, maritime law 
helps us to explore the effects of a ship captain’s discretion, which represents an 
extreme case of discretion. Ship captains historically enjoy exceptional powers when 
at sea (Tarrade, 1999). For instance, the 1276 Malacca Code stipulates that “the 
captain at sea is like the sovereign on land who carries the title of Commander of the 
Faithful.” Second, maritime law makes visible a class of decisions that are at the same 
time critical from an efficiency point of view and problematic in terms of fairness. 
These decisions are the expenditures or sacrifices managers can be required to make 
for the common wealth. For instance, in the event of a storm, the captain has full 
authority to jettison cargo to stabilize the ship. The resulting damage is called the 
“general average” because the damage is incurred for the collective interest. This kind 
of decision has a more general relevance in companies, where managers not only 
make decisions to “sacrifice” assets (for instance, through layoffs or restructuring 
plans), but can also proceed with beneficial actions (for instance, investing in research 
that develops employees’ competencies or making decisions that increase shareholder 
value). Finally, maritime law has adopted rules that differ fundamentally from those 
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of corporate law regarding value allocation. In the case of companies, there is no 
norm on how the impacts of managerial decisions on different parties are shared 
collectively. Corporate law leaves the question of allocation up to the board of 
directors. On the contrary, maritime law defines ex ante rules. When a ship’s captain 
decides to jettison cargo, all parties that are affected by this decision become 
interdependent and mutually liable. Thus, it is worth examining the rationale of 
maritime law regarding general averages.  
 
As we will now demonstrate, the historical case is also relevant because it 
provides a theoretical model of the “partnering effect” that explains why the rule of 
general averages is both efficient and fair in relation to the various stakeholders.  
 
The Rule of General Averages  
The exact origin of the rule of general averages is unknown, but traces have been 
found in ancient laws, and it seems to have been applied by most seagoing nations. 
The rule is apparently an example of lex maritima, dating back to the unwritten 
Rhodian Law of c. 800–900, but actual evidence has only been found from Roman 
Law onwards. Several authors have shown that the rule, which concerns “general” 
damages, was in permanent use from Lex Rhodia de Jactu (Rhodian Law of Jettison) 
to the York Antwerp Rules, which are still incorporated into international contracts of 
carriage today (BIMCO, 2002; Dusserre, 2004; Frignet, 1859; Hatchuel, 1997; 
Szramkiewicz, 1989; Tetley, 2003). Under maritime law, the owners of goods are 
responsible for covering certain maintenance and repair costs, but all those concerned 
with a maritime shipment must share the costs arising from the damages that are 
referred to as gross or “general averages.” 
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General averages correspond to expenditure, investments, or sacrifices made 
intentionally by the captain in the face of peril at sea or events that endanger the 
shipment. The York Antwerp Rules state that: “There is a general average act when, 
and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and 
reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose of preserving 
from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure” (York Antwerp 
Rules, 2004).  
 
The rules are as follows: 
- The captain can make expenditures or sacrifices if they are needed and if they are 
made in the reasonable interests of ensuring “the common safety.” In this event, 
the costs are shared in the common interest of the ship and its cargo. 
- A principle of fairness is then applied, obliging all of the people involved in the 
shipment to share the costs incurred by the captain or the damages suffered by the 
owner of the sacrificed goods. The owners of the ship and the cargo must share 
the sacrifice collectively. The contribution of each party is calculated pro rata 
based on the value of their property at the end of the voyage. 
 
The Partnering Effect of the Captain’s Discretion: a model 
At first sight, the rules seem relatively close to the partnership or corporate 
framework: the partners or the shareowners embark on a shared enterprise and in the 
event of losses, these are shared among the participants. However, the rules are quite 
original. Here, we identify three specificities.  
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 Captains’ discretion for the common good.  
Throughout the voyage, the merchants still own their goods, but they no longer 
manage them. The captain is entrusted by the different parties (the merchants and the 
ship owner) to make decision on their goods when necessary. The parties do not 
transfer their property rights, but transfer control of their goods to the captain, whose 
mission is to ensure that the goods arrive safe and sound.  
 
The discretion given to the captain is efficient because it provides the captain with 
the latitude necessary to make decisions. Thanks to this latitude, the captain can 
minimize damage. For instance, if one of the merchants issued instructions that 
influenced the order in which goods were jettisoned, this would be counterproductive, 
as in practice it would restrict the captain’s choices. The captain would be forced to 
jettison the goods in the prescribed order until the danger was averted. However, the 
total amount of cargo that was jettisoned would likely not be kept to a minimum, 
possibly leading to situations in which more goods were jettisoned than was strictly 
necessary. Overall, the system would be inefficient. Hence, the captain’s discretion 
means that the safeguarding of the shipment can be maximized in the event of danger, 
and the collective damages minimized.  
However, there is a condition necessary for this efficiency to occur: the captain’s 
discretion implies that the parties entrust him with authority on their behalf, and thus 
abandon their prerogative of control over their goods. 
  
 General averages and the “partnering effect”.  
The merchants are not related to each other a priori. Dispatching goods on the 
same ship is not partnering. However, maritime law views the damages incurred as a 
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result of the decisions of the captain as “general” instead of personal. This means that 
the merchants become related in the event that the captain decides to jettison goods. 
This act brings them together in relation to the goods whose loss saved the ship. The 
rule of general averages introduces a form of partnership, but this partnership is 
generated by the captain’s strategic intervention. Although they did not choose to 
come together, they are partnered in the sense that they are jointly liable for the 
general averages. 
 
Note that the partnering effect only covers damages resulting from the captain’s 
decisions. If the merchants and the captain had formed a company, they would pool 
the total proceeds of the sales made at the destination and, after deducting any losses 
and “general averages,” would share the profits in proportion to the initial shares of 
the goods sold. The rule of general averages does not work in quite the same way. 
Only the damages caused by the captain’s decision to jettison are pooled, and are 
shared by the merchants in proportion to the final value of the goods, not the initial 
value of the goods embarked.  
 
A solidarity rule: no distributive discretion.  
Any damages are to be shared when they result from decisions that are made by 
the management (captain) for the collective interests. The rule is fair because, in 
practice, damages are shared between the merchants and because the losses are not 
borne by the merchants in proportion to the value of the goods on board at the port of 
embarkation, but in proportion to the value of the goods at destination. The lost value 
is not the value of the goods at the outset of the journey, but the value they would 
have had if they had reached their destination. Note that the rule of general averages 
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does not apply to cases when goods are no longer fit for use or consumption on arrival 
at their destination. This is considered a “private” rather than a general average, and 
there are no grounds for compensating the owner. In addition, if the merchants had to 
share the losses in proportion to the initial value of the goods, this would rapidly give 
rise to unfair situations. Merchants whose goods had been saved and had increased in 
value during the voyage would be favored, while a merchant whose cargo had no 
value on arrival (e.g. food no longer fit for consumption, etc.) could not compensate 
others. 
 
The rule is therefore justified for all parties. It is preferable for each of the 
merchants, since the sharing of losses helps to limit their individual risk. In terms of 
probabilities, the expectations of gains are the same, but the shared risk is preferable 
in terms of risk aversion. The rule whereby losses are shared makes the sacrifice 
acceptable because of the understanding that it is a collective rather than an arbitrary 
sacrifice. Hence, it also makes the captain’s discretion acceptable.  
 
To summarize, maritime law provides the captain with great strategic discretion, 
but it restricts distributive discretion. Maritime law does not provide the captain with 
excessive leeway. It defines an ex ante rule to ensure that strategic discretion is 
exercised in a fair way. The discretionary power of the captain is legitimate only to 
the extent that the effects of his/her decisions are shared. In other words, because it 
acknowledges strategic discretion and its partnering effect, maritime law limits 
distributive discretion in favor of a solidarity rule. 
Figure 1 shows a model of the partnering effect that we derive from the case of 
maritime law.  
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-----INSERT FIGURE 1 -------- 
 
DISCUSSION: THE PARTNERING EFFECT IN A CORPORATE SETTING 
The rule of general averages provides important new insights into the way in 
which value is allocated in companies and helps us to analyze the relationship 
between managerial discretion and stakeholder management. To discuss the 
“structural soundness” of the analogy, we develop its theoretical and normative 
implications for companies along three lines. First, the analogy enriches our view of 
managerial discretion and makes visible the “general” impacts of managerial 
decisions upon stakeholders. Second, we argue that managerial discretion has a 
“partnering effect”, which leads to discriminate, among the stakeholders, those who 
are effectively partnered. Third, the analogy challenges both the team production 
theory of the corporation and corporate law by calling for a solidarity rule. 
 
Toward an expanded view of managerial discretion  
Building on the model of the ship captain’s authority, we distinguish two types of 
discretion. Distributive discretion is the latitude to “divide the pie” (Bailey, Hecht & 
Towry, 2011) and to allocate the production rents. In corporate law, the board has this 
latitude, as the various parties accept the transfer of property rights over the surplus to 
the corporation. The distributive discretion is seen as central in the literature to allow 
firm-specific investments by the parties. The board, as a “mediating hierarch” will 
monitor the efforts of each party to determine “how each can best be rewarded 
for past contributions, as well as be incentivized for future contributions, in the 
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process also guarding against mutual opportunism among the parties” (Lan and 
Heracleous, 2010: 300).  
Strategic discretion refers to the options available to managers (ship captains) to 
manage the business (ship) in the best interests of the company (for the common 
good). Strategic discretion does not imply the transfer of property rights, but rather 
control rights. This happens when the parties, while maintaining ownership of their 
assets, transfer their control rights so that management can use them for a collective 
strategy. For instance, shareholders own their share but entrust business leaders with 
the management of their capital. Similarly, workers own their competencies but their 
employment contract makes them subordinate. They are required to follow 
managerial prescriptions even when the strategy may impact them either positively 
(e.g. increase in human capital through learning processes) or negatively (e.g. limited 
employability). 
 
Distinguishing between these two forms of discretion leads to a different 
appreciation of the individual risks involved. It is generally acknowledged that 
stakeholders can make risky firm-specific investments. For instance, employees might 
invest in specialized learning processes whose outcomes only have value in their 
particular team (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). In this view, investment decisions are made 
by individuals and the risks they take derive directly from their investment decisions 
or from the opportunism of the other team members. However, this view overlooks 
that the investments of the stakeholders are often not decided by the parties 
themselves: the risks can result from the decisions made by the managers instead of 
them. 
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Managers, by their hierarchical function and by contract, are entitled to make 
decisions that may impact the potential (assets or capabilities) of some stakeholders. 
For instance, managers’ decisions can strengthen the human capital of some 
employees but it can also lead sometime to decrease the employability of employees. 
They can also increase or decrease the value of the company’s shares. As the 
consequences of their decisions are uncertain, managerial authority is a source of risk, 
at least for those who submit to their authority. However, neither the negative nor 
positive impacts of management decisions are usually seen as “general” averages. On 
the contrary, stakeholders generally appropriate the various assets that are 
(collectively) accumulated by a firm in accordance with their respective bargaining 
power (Coff, 1999). These assets are not considered as “general averages.”  
 
Conceptualizing strategic discretion leads us to identify what we term, by analogy 
with the rule of general averages, the “general impacts” of managerial discretion. 
These are the impacts on stakeholders of the managerial decisions that are made for 
collective purposes.  
 
The “Partnering Effect” of Managerial Discretion 
Managers are given strategic discretion to make decisions for the joint welfare, 
and their decisions inevitably have both positive and negative consequences for 
various individuals. However, these consequences should be considered as “general” 
rather than “personal.” Therefore, as in the case of maritime law, they should be 
viewed as collective, and shared among the team members. Under these conditions, 
we argue that the partnering effect should also be considered in the case of 
companies. 
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Conceptually, the partnering effect characterizes the interdependencies generated by 
the strategic discretion among the stakeholders that submit to hierarchy of managers. 
While all stakeholders can be impacted by management decisions, not all stakeholders 
transfer their control rights over their capital to management. Not all of them submit 
to hierarchy or consent to managerial discretion. We need to distinguish the parties 
which entitle managers to make decisions on their behalf, from those which keep their 
control rights and can sue management if they are negatively affected by a 
management decision.  
 
The partnering effect leads us to suggest that managerial discretion introduces 
differentiation among stakeholders. Stakeholder theorists have a broader view that 
includes the parties affected by management. Many typologies seek to account for 
managerial priorities (or to prioritize parties). For instance, internal/external or 
primary/secondary stakeholders are often distinguished. Kochan et al. (2000) come 
closer to the notion of team production by focusing on the stakeholders “who put 
something at risk” and speaking about “genuine stakeholders.” Other authors suggest 
different categories, such as stakewatchers and stakekeepers, and further outline the 
reciprocal obligations that some stakeholders can have toward the firm (Fassin, 2012). 
When Blair and Stout (1999) talk of a “production team,” they are referring to those 
who contribute, by their specific investment, to the production process. However, to 
the best of our knowledge, no distinction has been suggested that differentiates 
stakeholders based on their level of commitment to managerial authority. A 
distinction must then be made between those stakeholders who transfer their control 
rights to management and others. In other words, parties who formally accept 
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managerial authority and allow managerial discretion, i.e. give their consent (Phillips 
1997), entrust managers, and accept that their resources and capabilities are used in 
the common interest, are partnered. The other stakeholders can still be affected by the 
collective action but they continue to manage their resources on their own: they are 
not concerned by the partnering effect. 
 
This analysis invites to reconsider the perimeter of the team:  
- Typically, workers and stockholders will a priori be the most partnered 
stakeholders. Workers, as subordinates, permit management to define the actions 
that must be performed in doing their jobs. They are clearly subject to managerial 
discretion. Stockholders formally permit the board to make decisions to develop 
their capital on their behalf, although here, the legal status is less clear, and we can 
question whether all shareholders are partnered. Do those shareholders who 
remain anonymous and whose shareholding is only for a very short period really 
grant the board strategic discretion?  
- Similarly, we could consider some suppliers, subcontractors or service providers, 
even though they are a priori external to the company, as partnered parties if they 
agree to follow the company’s strategic orientations.  
 
The need for a solidarity rule  
Corporate law does not stipulate any general ex ante rule regarding the individual 
impact of managerial decisions. Thus, there are some cases where a solidarity rule 
could be interpreted as a rule of general averages. For instance, some legislation 
requires companies to negotiate agreements in relation to profit sharing. In France, 
when profits allow for an increase in equity, big companies must allocate a portion of 
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the newly created shares to their employees, who have made this increase in equity 
possible (Baghdadi, Bellakhal & Diaye, 2016). However, these are exceptions, and 
most of the time there is no solidarity regarding the “general” impact of managerial 
decisions.  
 
For instance, some employees can be laid off for economic reasons, that is, their 
sacrifice is considered necessary for the firm to survive. By law, they receive 
severance pay, but neither the loss they bear through being laid off nor the future 
profits of the company are shared. There is no such thing as the solidarity rule that we 
observed in the case of maritime law. Note that even among shareholders, there is no 
solidarity rule. The value of the company’s shares can vary significantly as a result of 
managerial decisions, but if one shareholder realizes a significant gain by selling 
his/her shares, he/she does not share his/her gain with the other shareholders (who do 
not sell), or with the other stakeholders.  
 
Here, the rule of general averages provides a compelling reason for challenging 
the adequacy of corporate law as a basis for stakeholder theory. Blair and Stout 
(1999) assume that corporate law was designed to give directors the leeway to 
allocate the results in a fair way. The board, as a “mediating hierarch” has the duty of 
promoting the interest of the corporation and of protecting it from various private 
demands and interests. Yet, as noted earlier, the interest of the corporation is not 
defined, and the neutrality of the board is somewhat hypothetical, and rarely verified, 
as only the shareholders can appoint directors. Theoretically, our analysis shows that 
while the team production theory relies on distributive discretion, it does not 
conceptualize strategic discretion and its related impacts. Thus, corporate law allows 
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for managerial discretion without requiring any solidarity between those who are 
affected by the related “general impacts” of managerial decisions.  
 
Under these conditions, we argue that distributive discretion is neither natural nor 
necessary. If strategic discretion has a “partnering effect,” then it binds together those 
stakeholders who actually recognize and accept managerial strategic discretion. Thus, 
it calls for a limitation of distributive discretion and for a solidarity rule to share the 
impacts of managerial decisions on “partnered stakeholders.”  
 
In practice, this rule would require ex ante that any strategy designed by corporate 
leaders must achieve a balance between employees and shareholders. Management 
should also be required to report on how they integrate fairness into their strategic 
thinking. Ex post, corporate officers should also be obliged to account for the general 
impacts of their decisions and to organize some form of redistribution when these 
impacts are not balanced. Some form of redistributive mechanism should be set up.  
 
For instance, when employees are made redundant for economic reasons, their 
layoffs are meant to enable the firm to survive. The solidarity principle would suggest 
that they should benefit at a later date from the profits that are made possible by their 
sacrifice. In practice, this could be achieved by a distribution of free shares to enable 
them to share in future dividends. However, one could also imagine the creation of a 
“solidarity fund.” All partnered stakeholders could contribute to this fund when their 
assets increased. For example, shareholders could be required to contribute a 
percentage to the fund when they sold their shares if the performance of the firm had 
increased the value of their shares. This fund could then be used to compensate the 
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partnered parties when they suffered “general damages.” Such mechanisms need to be 
further examined and tested. Our intention is not to formulate detailed mechanisms, 
but to suggest a general duty of fairness on the part of corporate leaders and to suggest 
that such a duty should be mandated by law. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Stakeholder theory suggests that multiple groups have a stake in the activities of 
the firm and merit consideration in managerial decision-making. It emphasizes the 
importance of non-stockholder groups to the success of companies. However, not all 
stakeholders who have legitimate claims receive the consideration they merit. To date, 
the freedom that managers have to allocate value among stakeholders has remained 
relatively unchallenged. However, given the inequalities that can be generated by 
corporate behavior, as scholars, we need to question this freedom and its foundations. 
 
In this article, we have built upon a historical case to discuss how stakeholder 
theory and corporate law connect value allocation and managerial discretion. Our aim 
in using this case was to show that managerial discretion has normative implications, 
and should lead to a solidarity rule. When stakeholders allow strategic discretion by 
recognizing managerial authority, they are made interdependent by the “partnering 
effect” of managerial discretion. As a result, they should jointly support the impacts 
of managerial decisions made for collective purposes.  
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Obviously, managerial authority differs from a ship captain’s authority, and its 
legal framework is, of course, highly specific (including rules such as the business 
judgment rule). The analogy does not build a case for transposing the rule of general 
averages from maritime law to the corporate setting. Rather, it offers creative 
theoretical insights through its contribution to the theorization of the partnering effect 
of strategic discretion. It also makes visible the implications of managerial discretion 
that to date have been ignored by both stakeholder theory and corporate law, and it 
helps us to discuss multiple related research questions such as managerial discretion, 
stakeholder theory, and solidarity in corporate law. Thus, it provides new insights into 
how we should conceptualize managerial discretion, and how to differentiate among 
the stakeholders partnered by strategic managerial discretion and the possible 
normative implications of this effect.  
 
Our study clearly calls for further research, especially empirical research (the third 
criterion of factual validity, according to Ketokivi et al., (2017)). The rule of general 
averages suggests a research agenda aimed at identifying the general impacts of 
managerial decisions that need to be considered and shared. Beyond financial profits, 
a variety of assets (e.g. cognitive, financial, and relational) would need to be taken 
into consideration. Here, both evaluation methods and management techniques need 
to be elaborated, as do the criteria for assessing what is meant by fair. For instance, 
the rewards do not need to be allocated equally among stakeholders. They can vary 
according to the level, length, and importance of the investments made by the various 
constituencies. New ways to design balanced strategies, to define fairness, and to 
organize solidarity also need to be explored.  
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More generally, our study opens up new avenues for research at the crossroads 
between management and law. By modelling the partnering effect of strategic 
discretion, our study questions how corporate law conceptualizes management and 
managerial discretion. The role of law is not to impose new duties or restrictions on 
the latitude of managers, but it has to build upon a comprehensive view of 
management to make sure managerial discretion can be exercised in an efficient and 
legitimate way. It is therefore necessary that research in management inspires more 
corporate law. While management scholars have sought to rethink management 
theory with a “view from law” (Lan and Heracleous, 2007), they could also question 
corporate law with a view from management and management history.  
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FIGURE  
 
Figure 1: A model of the "partnering effect" derived from Maritime Law 
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